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The End of Smuggling Hearsay: How
People v. Sanchez Redefined the Scope of
Expert Basis Testimony in California
and Beyond
Marissa N. Hamilton*
INTRODUCTION
It is a well-settled principal that expert witnesses may give
testimony in the form of an opinion, relying all or in part on
sources that are hearsay.1 An expert may explain to the jury on
direct examination the matters upon which the expert relied in
forming that opinion, even if those matters would ordinarily be
inadmissible.2 But when that matter is otherwise inadmissible
hearsay, how much substantive detail may the expert relate to
the fact-finder,3 and, further, how may the fact-finder consider
such evidence in evaluating the expert’s opinion?4
The California Supreme Court recently weighed in on these
questions in People v. Sanchez and clarified the proper application
of the hearsay rule as it relates to the scope of expert testimony.5
The Sanchez court issued a strict bright-line test, putting an end
to the prior paradigm in California:
When any expert relates to the jury case-specific out-of-court
statements, and treats the contents of those statements as true and
accurate to support the expert’s opinion, the statements are hearsay.
It cannot logically be maintained that the statements are not being
admitted for their truth.6

* J.D., Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, May 2018. Thank you to
Supervising Deputy Attorney General Scott Taryle and Deputy Attorney General
Nicholas Webster for bringing the Sanchez case and its importance to my attention,
Professor Scott Howe for his guidance and kind words of encouragement in writing this
Comment, and the Editors of the Chapman Law Review for their hard work throughout
the editing and publication process.
1 CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2017).
2 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (West 2017); see also People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320,
329 (Cal. 2016).
3 Can the expert relate all substantive details or just the general kind and source?
4 Can the evidence be considered as substantive evidence or only for the limited
purpose of evaluating the expert’s opinion?
5 See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 324.
6 Id. at 334.
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California courts have long paid lip service to the rule that
experts may not “under the guise of reasons [for their opinions]
bring before the jury incompetent hearsay evidence.”7 However,
prior to Sanchez, California courts allowed experts to testify to
hearsay statements as the basis for their opinions on the grounds
that such statements were being offered for a non-hearsay
purpose, and mitigated any potential hearsay problems with the
use of a two-pronged test.8 California’s two-pronged test was an
attempt to balance the “jury’s need for information sufficient to
evaluate [the] expert opinion” with the “accused’s interest in
avoiding substantive use of unreliable hearsay.”9
Under this two-pronged test, the courts would “cure” hearsay
problems by issuing a limiting instruction that matters admitted
through an expert go only to the basis of the expert’s opinion and
should not be considered for its truth.10 Thus, so as long as a
limiting instruction was provided to the jury, the expert could
testify to the hearsay details forming the basis of the expert’s
opinion.11 In situations where the court found a limiting
instruction not be enough to “cure” hearsay problems, the court
could elect to exclude, under California Evidence Code section
352, any hearsay with a potential for prejudice from the misuse
of the hearsay statements outweighed the probative value of
assisting the jury in evaluating the expert’s opinion.12
Under California Evidence law, expert testimony concerning
general background information, even if technically derived from
hearsay, has generally not been subject to exclusion on hearsay
grounds because experts assist the jury in understanding
subjects that are sufficiently beyond common experience.13 By
contrast, experts have traditionally, at least under common law,
been precluded from relating case-specific facts to the jury, since
the expert lacked independent knowledge of the facts.14 However,
under the pre-Sanchez two-pronged test paradigm, there was no
longer a need to distinguish between an expert’s testimony
concerning background information and case-specific facts
because the admissibility inquiry instead turned on whether the

7 People v. Coleman, 695 P.2d 189, 203 (Cal. 1985); see also People v. Linton, 302
P.3d 927, 969 (Cal. 2013); People v. Nicolaus, 817 P.2d 893, 910 (Cal. 1991); N. Am.
Capacity Ins. Co. v. Claremont Liab. Ins. Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 225, 244 (Ct. App. 2009).
8 See, e.g., People v. Montiel, 855 P.2d 1277, 1299 (Cal. 1993); People v. Gardeley,
927 P.2d 713, 721–22 (Cal. 1996).
9 Montiel, 855 P.2d at 1299.
10 Id; see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329.
11 Montiel, 855 P.2d at 1299; see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329.
12 Montiel, 855 P.2d at 1299; see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329.
13 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2017); Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 327.
14 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 327–28.
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jury could follow the court’s limiting instruction regarding the
nature of the case-specific out-of-court statements.15 The use of a
limiting instruction was sanctioned because it instructed the jury
that the hearsay contents could only be considered for the sole
purpose of evaluating the expert’s credibility, and not for the
truth of the matter asserted (i.e., not as independent substantive
proof of fact).16 However, such limiting instruction may “never
[be] tied to particular evidence, and the jury’s attention [may]
never [be] drawn to specific hearsay information disclosed by
expert witnesses which should only be considered as a basis for
evaluating their opinions.”17
What resulted was that the pre-Sanchez paradigm effectively
amounted to a hearsay exception, even though no such hearsay
exception existed.18 The blurring of this line between general
background knowledge and case-specific facts has, arguably,
opened the door to abuse; namely, expert witnesses being used as
conduits to transmit inadmissible hearsay that does not
otherwise fall under a statutory exception as assertions of fact to
the jury.19 With such a liberal approach to admissibility, there is
a risk that damaging inadmissible evidence, which would be
unable to make its way to the jury through the proper channels,
could be smuggled to the jury through the expert; or worse,
parties may offer expert testimony simply to place such
damaging evidence before the fact-finder disguised as expert
basis testimony.20 The Sanchez rule curbs this potential for abuse
with its bright-line rule prohibiting an expert from relating all
case-specific hearsay statements forming the basis of the expert’s
opinion, unless such hearsay statements fall under an applicable
hearsay exception or are properly admitted independent of the
expert’s testimony.21

Id.
See Montiel, 855 P.2d at 1299 (stating “matters admitted through an expert go
only to the basis of [the expert’s] opinion and should not be considered for their truth”).
17 Id. at 1299–1300.
18 Cf. DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE – EXPERT
EVIDENCE 190 (2d ed. 2010).
19 See Patrick Mark Mahoney, Houses Built on Sand: Police Expert Testimony in
California Gang Prosecutions; Did Gardeley Go Too Far?, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385,
386–87 (2004) (arguing the Gardeley court erred in permitting the expert to relate
otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence as the basis of the expert’s opinion, and the
California Supreme Court missed a critical opportunity to emphasize a restrictive view of
expert testimony and the importance of judicial gatekeeping); see also People v. Zavala,
No. H036028, 2013 WL 5720149, at *58 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2013) (Rushing, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “rote application of the not-for-truth rationale to police gang
experts has opened the gates to a veritable flood of incriminating hearsay”).
20 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, at 170–71.
21 See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 333–34 (Cal. 2016).
15
16
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While the Sanchez hearsay ruling does not change the basic
understanding of the definition of hearsay, it does restore the
restrictive common law approach in dealing with the scope of
expert basis testimony, which has substantial implications for
California trial practice both in criminal and civil contexts.
California courts may no longer overrule a hearsay objection on
the grounds that the hearsay is being considered solely for
explaining the basis of the expert’s opinion, and experts may no
longer be asked to assume case-specific facts and opine on the
significance of such case-specific facts, if such facts have not
been, or will not be, independently admitted into evidence. Since
the paradigm of allowing a limiting instruction to justify the
admittance of expert basis testimony is no longer tenable under
Sanchez, trial counsel will be forced to shift their focus to
ensuring they have established a proper evidentiary basis for
admission of case-specific facts forming the basis of expert
opinion testimony. This may include calling more witnesses to
properly authenticate and introduce evidence that trial counsel
wishes the expert relate to the jury. But if that’s not possible,
trial counsel may be unable to present such evidence all together.
This Comment explores the various trial contexts the
Sanchez hearsay rule will likely affect. Part I discusses the facts
of Sanchez and summarizes the California Supreme Court’s
lengthy hearsay discussion and ruling. Part II explores both the
criminal and civil implications of the Sanchez ruling in California
trial practice. Part II also surveys various states that do not
follow a restrictive approach to the scope of expert basis
testimony, and exposes the problems surrounding such a liberal
approach, thereby urging states to adopt and follow a
Sanchez-like rule. Lastly, Part III examines the differences
between California’s Sanchez approach and the Federal Rules of
Evidence related to the scope of expert basis testimony. Part III
also surveys the variances in interpretation and application of
Federal Rule of Evidence 703, namely, the ongoing controversy
as to how much, if any, substantive hearsay detail an expert may
relate to the fact-finder as opinion basis testimony in both federal
courts and legal scholarship. Finally, this Comment also argues
that other state courts, as well as federal courts, should follow
California’s restrictive Sanchez approach to hearsay as it relates
to the scope of expert basis testimony. Sanchez was a criminal
case and therefore also addressed Confrontation Clause
concerns;22 however, this Comment focuses solely on the
implications of the hearsay ruling.

22

See infra notes 38, 39, 76, 80 and accompanying text.
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I. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DECISION:
PEOPLE V. SANCHEZ
In the June 30, 2016 case, People v. Sanchez, the California
Supreme Court considered the application of the hearsay rule as it
relates to case-specific out-of-court statements offered as the basis
of an expert’s opinion.23 The Sanchez court took the opportunity to
“revisit and revamp” the proper application of California Evidence
Code sections 801 and 802, specifically the application of the
hearsay rule as it relates to the scope of expert testimony.24 The
court issued a bright-line test in an attempt to restore the common
law distinction between general background information and
case-specific facts: “When any expert relates to the jury casespecific out-of-court statements, and treats the contents of those
statements as true and accurate to support the expert’s opinion,
the statements are hearsay.”25
A. Facts and Procedural History
On October 16, 2011, the defendant, Marcos Arturo Sanchez,
was charged with various criminal felonies coupled with gang
enhancements, including active participation in and commission of
a felony for the benefit of the Delhi gang.26 At trial, David Stow, a
police detective, testified for the prosecution as a gang expert.27
The expert testified generally about gang culture, in particular,
the Delhi gang’s culture and pattern of criminal activity.28 The
expert’s testimony then turned to the defendant specifically,
regarding the details of defendant’s STEP notice,29 FI card,30

Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 324.
John T. Brazier & Katherine Frank, Hearsay, the Experts Say!, L.A. DAILY J. (Nov.
21, 2016), http://www.cgdrblaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Hearsay-The-ExpertsSay.pdf; see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 324.
25 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 328, 334.
26 Id. at 324.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 325.
29 STEP notices, or the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act,
are issued by police officers to individuals associating with known gang members. Id. at 324
n.3. The purpose of STEP notices is two-fold; they provide, as well as gather, information. Id.
at 324. The STEP notices provide notice to the recipient that they are associating with a
known gang, the gang engages in criminal activity, and, if the recipient commits certain
crimes with gang members, the recipient may face enhanced penalties for the crimes. Id.
The STEP notices also gather information (such as the date and time the notice was given)
and identify information (such as descriptions of tattoos, identification of the recipient’s
associates, and any statements made at the time of the interaction). Id. at 324–25.
30 FI cards, or field identification cards, are small reports prepared by police officers
that record the police officer’s contact with the individual. Id. at 325. FI cards record the
date and time of the contact; personal information about the individual, associates,
nicknames; and any statements made at the time of the interaction. Id.
23
24
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previous police contacts, and prior police contacts while in the
company of known Delhi gang members.31
On direct examination, the prosecutor asked the expert a
lengthy hypothetical in which the expert was asked to assume
the out-of-court statements from the STEP notice, FI card, and
previous police contacts.32 Based on these assumed out-of-court
facts, the expert opined the defendant’s conduct indicated that he
was a member of the Delhi gang and committed the crime for the
benefit the Delhi gang.33
On cross-examination, the expert admitted that he had never
met defendant, was not present when defendant was given the
STEP notice, and was not present during any of defendant’s
other police contacts.34 Further, the expert stated that his
knowledge of defendant’s prior police contacts while in the
company of known Delhi gang members were derived solely from
police reports and FI cards prepared by other officers.35
The jury convicted defendant on all charges, including the
gang enhancement charges.36 The Court of Appeal reversed
defendant’s conviction for active gang participation, but otherwise

31 Id. at 325. The expert testified the defendant had received a STEP notice earlier
in 2011, in which “the defendant indicate[d] to the police officer . . . that the defendant for
four years had kicked it with the guys from Delhi,” and that the defendant “got busted
with two guys from Delhi.” Id. The prosecutor questioned the expert about four other
contacts that defendant had with police officers between 2007 and 2009. Id. The expert’s
testimony relayed detailed statements from police documents, including: (1) that on
August 11, 2007, defendant’s cousin, a known Delhi member, was shot while defendant
stood next to him and that defendant grew up in the Delhi neighborhood; (2) that on
December 30, 2007, defendant was with a documented Delhi member when that member
was shot from a passing car by a rival gang member; (3) that on December 4, 2009, an
officer contacted defendant in the company of a documented Delhi member and completed
an FI card; and (4) that on December 9, 2009, defendant was arrested in a garage with
two known Delhi members where police officers found a surveillance camera, Ziploc
baggies, narcotics, and a firearm. Id. at 325.
32 The hypothetical question was:
(1) a Delhi gang member, ‘who’s indicated to the police he kicks it with Delhi
and has been contacted in a residence where narcotics and a firearm have been
found in the past,’ is contacted by police in Delhi territory on October 16, 2011;
(2) that gang member ‘grabbed something, and then grabs his waistband’ as he
runs up the stairs into an apartment; and (3) he runs into the bathroom and
police later find a loaded firearm and drugs on a tar outside the bathroom
window.
Id.
33 The expert reasoned that the defendant was “willing to risk incarceration by
possessing a firearm and narcotics for sale in the Delhi’s turf,” and that the defendant’s
conduct “created fear in the community redounding to Delhi’s benefit.” Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 326.
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affirmed the criminal and other gang enhancement convictions.37
The California Supreme Court granted review to clarify the proper
application of California Evidence Code sections 801 and 802
regarding the scope of expert witnesses concerning case-specific
hearsay content in explaining the opinion basis.38
B. California Supreme Court Analysis and Holding
The defendant contended the expert’s testimony detailing
descriptions of defendant’s past contacts with police officers was
offered for its truth and, therefore, constituted hearsay.39 The
Attorney General claimed the statements made by the expert
were not admitted for their truth, but rather to aid the jury in
evaluating the expert’s testimony, and therefore not hearsay.40
The California Supreme Court provided an in-depth
discussion on hearsay, from its historical common law
development to its modern status as it relates to expert basis
testimony.41 California Evidence Code section 1200 defines
hearsay as “evidence of a statement that was made other than by
a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to
prove the truth of the matter stated,” and provides that hearsay
is inadmissible unless it falls under an exception.42 The Court
noted that, as a matter of practicality, the hearsay rule has
traditionally not barred an expert from testifying about general
background knowledge in the expert’s field of expertise, even if
that expert’s general knowledge comes from inadmissible
hearsay evidence.43 This is because “the common law recognized
that experts frequently acquired their knowledge from hearsay,”
and “to reject . . . some facts to which [the expert] testifies are
known to [them] only upon the authority of others would be to

37 Id. The reversal was based on precedent that established the substantive offense
of active gang participation required the defendant commit an underlying felony with at
least one other gang member. Id. at 326 n.5.
38 Id. at 324. The court also granted review to consider the degree to which the
Crawford rule, concerning the Confrontation Clause, limits an expert witness from
relating case-specific hearsay content as the basis for the expert’s opinion when the basis
involves testimonial hearsay. Id.
39 Id. at 326. The defendant further argued that admission of the expert’s testimony
violated the Confrontation Clause because the statements were testimonial hearsay. Id.
40 Id. The Attorney General further contended that even if the expert’s statements
were admitted for their truth, the expert’s statements were not testimonial and thus not
in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Id.
41 See generally id. at 326–30.
42 Id. at 326. The Senate Committee comments to California Evidence Code section
1200 provide that a statement “offered for some purpose other than to prove the fact
stated therein is not hearsay,” and thus usually admissible. Id.
43 Id. at 327.
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ignore the accepted methods of professional work and to insist on
impossible standards.”44
However, the court continued, “an expert has traditionally
been precluded from relating case-specific facts about which the
expert has no independent knowledge.”45 Generally, parties
establish the facts on which their case relies by calling witnesses
who have personal knowledge of the case-specific facts.46 Then, a
party calls an expert witness to testify as to generalized
background information to help the fact-finder understand the
significance of the case-specific facts and to provide an opinion on
what the case-specific facts might mean.47
The use of hypothetical questions also honors the common
law distinction between general background information and
case-specific facts because under “this technique, other witnesses
suppl[y] admissible evidence of the facts, the attorney ask[s] the
expert witness to hypothetically assume the truth of those facts,
and the expert testifie[s] to an opinion based on the assumed
facts.”48 The common law strictly followed the rule that “[i]f no
competent evidence of a case-specific fact has been, or will be,
admitted, the expert cannot be asked to assume it.”49
The Sanchez court acknowledged that the modern treatment
of an expert’s testimony as to general background information
and case-specific hearsay has become “blurred.”50 Recognizing the
common law justifications51 for exceptions to the general rule
barring disclosure of and reliance on otherwise inadmissible casespecific hearsay—mainly practicality and judicial economy—the
Legislature generalized these justifications in the enactment of

44 Ian Volek, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Back Door and the
Confrontation Clause, Ten Years Later, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 965 (2011) (quoting 1
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 665 (2d ed. 1923)); see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 327.
45 Id. The court defines case-specific facts as “those relating to the particular events
and participants alleged to have been involved in the case being tried.” Sanchez, 374 P.3d
at 327.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 328 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Gordian Knot of the Treatment
of Secondhand Facts Under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 Governing the Admissibility
of Expert Opinions: Another Conflict Between Logic and Law, 3 U. DEN. CRIM. L. REV. 1,
5 (2013)).
49 Id. at 328.
50 Id.
51 These justifications included: (1) “the routine use of the same kinds of hearsay by
experts in their conduct outside the court;” (2) “the experts’ experience, which included
experience in evaluating the trustworthiness of such hearsay sources;” and (3) “the desire
to avoid needlessly complicating the process of proof.” Id. at 329 (quoting KAYE ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 155).
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the California Evidence Code in 1965.52 Under California Evidence
Code sections 801(b)53 and 802,54 “reliability of the evidence is a
key inquiry in whether expert testimony may be admitted.”55 The
rationale in allowing an expert to rely on information that is of a
type generally relied upon by experts in that field is that it
“assures the reliability and trustworthiness of the information
used by experts in forming their opinions.”56 Therefore, to explain
his or her basis to a fact-finder, “an expert is entitled to explain to
the jury the ‘matter’ upon which he [or she] relied, even if that
matter would ordinarily be inadmissible.”57
Naturally, courts have grappled with how much substantive
case-specific hearsay an expert may provide to the jury and how
the jury may consider this evidence.58 The California Supreme
Court has long held that “an expert may not ‘under the guise of
reasons [for an opinion] bring before the jury incompetent
hearsay evidence.’”59 In an attempt to resolve this problem,
California has followed “a two-pronged approach to balancing ‘an
expert’s need to consider extrajudicial matters, and a jury’s need
for information sufficient to evaluate an expert opinion’ so as not
to ‘conflict with an accused’s interest in avoiding substantive use
of unreliable hearsay.’”60
The first prong involved the use of a limiting instruction to
“cure” hearsay problems, whereby the judge instructed the jury
that matters admitted through an expert should go only to the
basis of the expert’s opinion and should not be considered for its
truth.61 The second prong was applicable in instances where a
limiting instruction may not be enough to “cure” the hearsay

Id.
California Evidence Code section 801(b) provides that an expert witness may
render an opinion “[b]ased on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience,
training, and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known
to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to
which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter
as a basis for his opinion.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 2016); see also Sanchez, 374
P.3d at 329.
54 California Evidence Code section 802 states that an expert “may state on direct
examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter (including, in the case of an
expert, his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) upon which it is
based, unless he is precluded by law in using such reasons or matter as a basis for his
opinion.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (West 2016); see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329.
55 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329.
56 Id. (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2016) (Law Revision Commission Cmt.)).
57 See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329.
58 Id.
59 Id. (quoting People v. Coleman, 695 P.2d 189, 203 (1985)).
60 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329 (quoting People v. Montiel, 855 P.2d 1277, 1299 (1993)).
61 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329.
52
53
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problems.62 In this situation, the court would apply California
Evidence Code section 352, the balancing test that allows the
court to exclude from an expert’s testimony any hearsay whose
irrelevance, unreliability, or potential for prejudice outweighs the
probative value of the expert’s testimony.63
The court stated that, “under this paradigm, there was no
longer a need to carefully distinguish between an expert’s
testimony regarding background information and case-specific
facts” because “[t]he inquiry instead turned on whether the jury
could properly follow the court’s limiting instruction in light of
the nature and amount of the out-of-court statements
admitted.”64 The court “conclude[d] this paradigm is no longer
tenable because an expert’s testimony regarding the basis for an
opinion must be considered for its truth by the jury.”65
The Sanchez court acknowledged that other courts have
avoided hearsay issues entirely by finding that statements
related by experts are not hearsay because they are not admitted
for their truth, but rather “go only to the basis of [the expert’s]
opinion.”66 However, the Sanchez court disagreed with this
“not-for-truth” rationale, calling it a logical fallacy.67 The court
reasoned that “[w]hen an expert relies on hearsay to provide
case-specific facts, considers the statements as true, and relates
them to the jury as a reliable basis for the expert’s opinion, it
cannot logically be asserted that the hearsay content is not
offered for its truth.”68 This is because “the validity of [the
expert’s] opinion ultimately turn[s] on the truth of . . . [the
hearsay] statement . . . if the hearsay that the expert relies on
and treats as true is not true,” then “an important basis for the
opinion is lacking.”69
Further criticizing the “not-for-truth” rationale, the court
noted that when an expert witness is not testifying in the form of
a proper hypothetical question and evidence of the case-specific
facts the expert is testifying to has not, and will not, be properly

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 329–30. While the court concluded the old paradigm is no longer tenable,
the rationale the court provides suggests the old paradigm was never tenable to begin
with. Thus, it is interesting to note that essentially nothing about the actual rule has
changed, other than the courts implementation and opinion on how it should be applied
and policed in practice.
66 Id. at 330 (quoting People v. Montiel, 855 P.2d 1277, 1299 (1993)).
67 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 332.
68 Id.
69 Id. (citing Williams v. Illinios, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2258 (2012) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis removed).
62
63
64
65
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admitted independent of the expert’s testimony, “there is no
denying that such facts are being considered by the expert, and
offered to the jury, as true.”70 In this case, the jury was
instructed that they “must decide whether information on which
the expert relied was true and accurate,”71 while at the same
time instructed that “the gang expert’s testimony concerning ‘the
statements by the defendant, police reports, F.I. cards, STEP
notices, and speaking to other officers or gang members’” should
not be considered for their truth.72
The court opined that “[j]urors cannot logically follow these
conflicting instructions” because the jury “cannot decide whether
the information relied on by the expert ‘was true and accurate’
without [first] considering whether the specific evidence
identified by the instruction, and upon which the expert based
his opinion, was also true.”73 To admit the case-specific basis
testimony as nonhearsay, presented solely to aid the jury in
evaluating the expert’s testimony, would be “to ignore the reality
that jury evaluation of the expert requires a direct assessment of
the truth of the expert’s basis.”74
The California Supreme Court’s ruling75 restores the
traditional common law distinction between an expert witness’s
testimony regarding general background information and
case-specific facts: “When any expert relates to the jury casespecific out-of-court statements, and treats the content of those
statements as true and accurate to support the expert’s opinion,
the statements are hearsay. It cannot logically be maintained
that the statements are not being admitted for their truth.”76
The court expressly disapproved of its prior decisions that
held: (1) an expert’s basis testimony is not offered for its truth;
(2) a limiting instruction coupled with the court balancing
the prejudicial effect versus probative value sufficiently
addresses hearsay issues; and (3) an expert may testify to

Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 333.
Id. (quoting Judicial Counsel of California Criminal Jury Instruction § 332
(Oct. 2017)).
72 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 333 (quoting jury instructions used at trial).
73 Id.
74 Id. (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, at 179–80).
75 The California Supreme Court made clear the ruling in Sanchez does not change
the basic understanding of the definition of hearsay. See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 326.
76 Id. at 334. The court’s rule also went on to state that in the context of criminal
cases, “[i]f the case is one in which a prosecution expert seeks to relate testimonial
hearsay, there is a Confrontation Clause violation unless (1) there is a showing of
unavailability and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination, or
forfeited that right by wrongdoing.” Id. at 334–35.
70
71
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case-specific out-of-court statements when no applicable
hearsay exception applies.77
The court summarized what an expert can do and what an
expert cannot do in light of its ruling in Sanchez. An expert
witness can “still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion” and can
tell the jury “in general terms” that he or she did so by
“relat[ing] generally the kind and source of the ‘matter’ upon
which his [or her] opinion rests.”78 What an expert cannot do, the
court explained, is relate case-specific facts asserted in hearsay
basis statements as true, unless those case-specific facts are
proven independently by competent evidence or are covered by
an applicable hearsay exception.79
The California Supreme Court concluded the admission of
the gang expert’s hearsay testimony relating the case-specific
statements concerning the defendant’s gang affiliations were
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 80 Accordingly, the
court reversed the findings on the defendant’s criminal street
gang enhancements.81
II. APPLICATION OF SANCHEZ BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE
CRIMINAL GANG CONTEXT
While Sanchez dealt with criminal gang enhancements, and
thus addressed Confrontation Clause concerns, the court’s ruling
on the proper application of the hearsay rule as it relates to casespecific out-of-court statements offered as expert basis testimony
applies equally to other criminal, as well as civil, contexts.82
Section A discusses the extension of the Sanchez rule to other
criminal contexts in California, including drug possession cases
and Mentally Disordered Offenders (“MDO”) and Sexually
Violent Predator (“SVP”) proceedings. Section A also looks at how
other states apply the hearsay rule to case-specific out-of-court
statements offered as expert basis testimony in these criminal
See id. at 334 n.13.
Id. at 334.
Id. For example, the court stated the length of a skid mark measured at an
accident scene is a case-specific fact, while how skid marks are left on the pavement and
the fact that the speed of the vehicle can be estimated based on the skid mark is general
background information. Id. at 328. A witness who measured the skid mark at the
accident scene could establish this case-specific fact. Id. The proper subject of an expert’s
opinion in this situation could include that the car that left the skid mark had been
traveling at about eighty miles an hour when the brakes were applied. Id.
80 Id. at 344. The court further held the police reports and STEP notice the expert
relied upon in describing the basis of his opinion recited testimonial hearsay, and thus
violated the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 340–44. The court held the FI card may be
testimonial, but did not rule definitively on the issue. See id. at 342–44.
81 Id. at 344.
82 See infra Sections II(A) and II(B).
77
78
79
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contexts. Section B explores how the Sanchez rule will likely
affect civil cases in California, including product and strict
liability, negligence, medical malpractice, personal injury, and
valuation cases. Section B also discusses how other states apply
the hearsay rule to case-specific out-of-court statements offered
as expert basis testimony in these civil contexts. This Part also
urges other states to adopt a Sanchez-like rule in determining
the admissibility and scope of expert basis testimony.
A. Other Criminal Contexts
California courts have applied the Sanchez rule in criminal
cases outside of the gang enhancement context, namely in drug
possession cases and MDO and SVP proceedings.83 Other states,
however, have not applied a restrictive Sanchez-like approach
to the scope of expert basis testimony relating inadmissible
hearsay in these criminal contexts, but should adopt a
Sanchez-like rule.84
1. Drug Possession
In a criminal context, the Sanchez ruling will have a sizeable
impact on drug possession cases. In a case decided shortly after
Sanchez, People v. Stamps,85 a California Appellate Court
extrapolated the hearsay rule in Sanchez and applied it to a
criminal drug possession case. In Stamps, the defendant, who
was convicted of multiple drug possession offenses, argued on
appeal the trial court improperly admitted the case-specific
hearsay testimony of a criminalist expert witness.86 At trial, the
expert testified that her identification of the drugs in pill form
was based solely on a visual comparison of the shape, color, and
markings of the seized pills to those on a website called “Ident-ADrug.”87 The defendant argued the expert should not have been
allowed to testify as to the case-specific contents of the Ident-ADrug website because the expert’s testimony was inadmissible
hearsay the jury considered for its truth and used as direct
evidence of the charged offenses.88

See infra Sections II(A)(1) and II(A)(2).
See infra Sections II(A)(1) and II(A)(2).
207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828 (Ct. App. 2016).
Id. at 829.
Id. at 830–31. The Ident-A-Drug website allows a user to enter the color, shape,
markings, class, brand, or other descriptions on a pill in order to identify what
substance the pill is likely to contain. See Therapeutic Research Center, IDENT-A-DRUG
REFERENCE (Oct. 21, 2017, 7:56 PM), http://identadrug.therapeuticresearch.com/home
[http://perma.cc/GR5Q-P5AN].
88 Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 830.
83
84
85
86
87
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The court discussed Sanchez in depth and held that “[i]t is
[the] non-Crawford aspect of Sanchez that comes into play [in
this case].”89 The court stated, “[a]fter Sanchez, reliability is no
longer the sole touchstone of admissibility where expert
testimony to hearsay is at issue” and, as such, “[i]ncorporated
within the Sanchez rule is . . . a new litmus test . . . [that]
depends on whether the matter the prosecution seeks to elicit is
‘case-specific hearsay’ or . . . part of the [expert’s] ‘general
background information.’”90
Applying Sanchez, the court reversed the defendant’s
conviction of possession of the drugs in pill form.91 The contents of
the Ident-A-Drug website could not be independently admissible
because the statements were hearsay,92 and the prosecution failed
to offer any hearsay exception that would render the website
statements admissible.93 Further, the court concluded the Ident-ADrug hearsay statements were “admitted as proof of the
very gravamen of the crime with which [the defendant] was
charged,” and clearly were case-specific facts, rendering the
expert’s basis testimony inadmissible under Sanchez.94
The factual circumstances in Stamps are by no means a
one-time occurrence. In the 2014 California case, People v. Logan,
the court was faced with a set of facts nearly identical to those in
Stamps.95 In Logan, however, the California Appellate Court
reached the opposite conclusion on the admissibility of the
89 Id. at 833 n.5 (stating “[t]he Crawford line of cases has no direct application here
because the challenged hearsay was not testimonial”).
90 Id. at 833–34.
91 Id. at 836. In determining its reversal, the court also went through a harmless
error analysis. The court determined the expert’s Ident–A–Drug website testimony was
the only evidence that the pills indeed contained the drugs charged, and therefore could
not be dismissed as “carrying little weight with the jury or being duplicative of other
evidence.” Id. at 835. As an aside, the court affirmed the possession conviction of the
drugs in crystalline form because the prosecution proved the chemical composition of the
crystalline drugs through the expert witness, who performed a detailed chemical analysis
on the crystalline drugs, and thus there was no Sanchez violation with respect to this
evidence. Id. at 830.
92 Id. at 834 n.6 (stating that, based on the expert’s testimony, the Ident-A-Drug
website “provided photographs of the pills, together with sufficient text to
communicate that the photograph depicted a specified pharmaceutical,” thus “this
combined content . . . constitute[d] an out-of-court ‘statement’ of a ‘person’ (the person
who entered the information on the Web site) so as to bring it within the definition of
hearsay” under California evidence law).
93 Id. at 834–35.
94 Id. at 835.
95 People v. Logan, No. A137403, 2014 WL 971444, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13,
2014). In Logan, the defendant, like in Stamps, was charged with possession of drugs in
both crystalline and pill form, and the expert ran a chemical analysis only on the drugs in
crystalline form. Id. As for identifying the drugs in pill form, the expert visually identified
the pills by entering the color, shape, and markings of the pills on the Ident-A-Drug
website. Id.

Do Not Delete

2018]

4/24/2018 4:56 PM

The End of Smuggling Hearsay

523

expert’s testimony regarding the Ident-A-Drug hearsay
contents.96 Instead, the court’s Ident-A-Drug testimony analysis
focused on reliability of the website’s contents as being the
“preliminary fact[or]” of admissibility.97 The Logan court opined
the Ident-A-Drug hearsay statements were admissible because
the website constituted a material that was “of the type
reasonably relied upon by experts in [the expert’s] field,” and
any challenge as to whether the expert’s identification of the
pills was faulty went “to the weight of [the expert’s] testimony,
not its admissibility.”98
If Logan, or a factually similar case, was presented to a
California court post-Sanchez, the Sanchez (and Stamps) rulings
indicate the prosecutor would not be able to get the website
contents before the jury unless the prosecutor called another
witness to properly authenticate and admit the evidence, or it fell
within an applicable hearsay exception. However, proper
independent admission in most cases is unlikely given the
anonymity of many Internet sources and courts’ general
skepticism towards the reliability of Internet sources.99
Other states, such as Arizona, Louisiana, Texas, Ohio, and
Washington, have been generally consistent in allowing experts
to testify to case-specific hearsay contents in the context of drug
identification cases.100 In criminal drug possession cases, states
Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *3. The court determined that even though the expert did not know the
particular details about the Ident-A-Drug website (e.g., the website author, who
maintained the website, how often it was updated), it did not mean that the website
contents were “speculative, conjectural, or lacking a reasonable basis.” Id. at *4.
98 Id. It should be noted the court determined that the admissions hearsay exception
would, in this particular case, render the expert’s testimony regarding the Ident-A-Drug
website contents admissible even if the court determined the trial court erred in allowing
the testimony. Id. (stating the defendant himself admitted to the same evidence offered by
the expert). However, what is significant is that the court found that disclosing the
otherwise inadmissible hearsay basis was allowed, regardless of whether such evidence
was properly independently supplied or whether an applicable hearsay exception was
present. Id.
99 See People v. Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828, 834–35 (Ct. App. 2016) (stating that
courts continue to view the Internet “‘warily and wearily’ as a catalyst for ‘rumor,
innuendo, and misinformation’” because “[t]he Internet ‘provides no way of verifying the
authenticity’ of its contents”). The court went on to state, websites are unreliable because
“[a]nyone can put anything on the Internet,” websites are not “monitored for accuracy and
nothing contained therein is under oath,” and “hackers can adulterate the content.” Id.
100 See, e.g., Pineda v. State, No. 13-13-00574-CR, 2015 WL 5311237, at *4–5 (Tex. Ct.
App. Sept. 10, 2015) (where the expert testified as to the chemical composition and weight
of the seized pills based solely on a visual comparison on “Drugs.com”); State v. Murphy,
28 So.3d 496, 499 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (where the expert testified as to the identification of
the seized pills solely by a visual examination and comparison of the pills’ characteristics
with a website called “Just Drug Identification”); State v. Garnett, No. 12CA0099-M, 2013
WL 6021467, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2013) (where the expert testified as to the
identification of the seized pills based solely on her use of the Ident-A-Drug database,
instead of testing the milligram composition of the pills); State v. Sandoval, No. 1CA96
97
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should follow the restrictive Sanchez (and Stamps) approach to
determine the admissibility of expert basis testimony when
case-specific hearsay is at issue.101 Even putting aside issues
related to unreliability of anonymous Internet sources, the
admission of this kind of case-specific hearsay presents
problems. As the Stamps court recognized, no special expertise
is required to enter the characteristics of a pill onto a website
and interpret the results provided by the website; so in
instances such as this, the expert’s testimony “[does] not reveal
any special expertise . . . beyond ordinary visual acuity . . . so as
to make it an integral part of some larger opinion.”102 By
presenting hearsay evidence solely through the expert, the court
is “allow[ing] [the expert] to place case-specific non-expert
opinion before the jury, with the near certainty that the jury
[will] rely on the underlying hearsay as direct proof of the
chemical composition of the pills.”103 In this type of factual
circumstance, the expert is the only source of the identification
evidence presented to the jury; the expert unavoidably becomes
a “mere conduit” for the hearsay contents.104 Absent the expert
testimony proffering the case-specific hearsay to the jury, these
convictions likely would not stand. 105 Therefore, other states
CR14-0242, 2015 WL 1035236, at *6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015) (where the expert
testified as to the identification of the seized pills based solely on the use of a website that
law enforcement used to gather information about drugs and by a conversation with a
non-testifying pharmacist at Walgreens); State v. Carter, 981 So.2d 734, 744 (La. Ct. App.
2008) (where the expert testified as to the identification of the seized pills based solely on
a visual inspection and comparison of the pill’s characteristics with a book); State v.
White, No. 24174–2–III, 2006 WL 1778096, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. June 29, 2006)
(where the expert testified as to the identification of a seized pill capsule based solely on a
conversation, in which the expert described the pill’s characteristics and logo, with a nontestifying poison control center employee).
101 Note, I am not proposing that a chemical analysis must be conducted in order for
there to be a conviction. Many states, including California, have explicitly held that a
defendant may be convicted of drug possession without a chemical analysis of the drugs.
See, e.g., People v. Camp, 163 Cal. Rptr. 510, 512 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating the court does
not know of any case precedent that holds a chemical analysis of a substance is required
for a possession conviction); People v. Sonleitner, 228 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that the fact the prosecution did not conduct a chemical analysis on the
substance did not warrant a reversal of defendant’s conviction because “the nature of a
substance, like any other fact in a criminal case, may be proved by circumstantial
evidence”); White, 2006 WL 1778096, at *3 (“A chemical analysis of a suspected controlled
substance is not essential to a conviction in a criminal trial proceeding . . . .”); Carter, 981
So.2d at 745 (“An expert may identify a controlled substance without chemical analysis.”)
(quoting Sterling v. State, 791 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).
102 Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 831 n.2.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 998 (“We conclude it is reasonably probable the jury would have
acquitted [the defendant] of the charges based on pill possession in the absence of the
Ident-A-Drug testimony.”). For other state courts which have concluded similarly, see,
e.g., People v. Hard, 342 P.3d 572, 579 (Colo. App. 2014), which found the admission of
the expert’s testimony regarding visual identification of the pills via “Drugs.com” was not
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should follow California’s Sanchez hearsay rule in drug
possession cases to uphold the intent of the rule against hearsay
and curb convictions resulting largely based on inadmissible,
unsubstantiated, and unreliable hearsay.106
2. Mentally Disordered Offenders and Sexually Violent
Predator Proceedings
Another criminal context107 the Sanchez ruling will have a
large impact on is MDO108 and SVP109 proceedings. In MDO and
SVP cases, defendants convicted of serious crimes meeting
statutory requirements face civil commitment, and prosecution
experts are called to opine on defendants’ mental status and

harmless because the expert’s “testimony . . . was the only evidence presented at trial to
identify some of the pills” and thus the court could not “say with fair assurance that the
erroneous admission of [the expert’s] testimony did not substantially influence the
verdicts in this case.”
106 Many legal scholars agree the reason for the rule against hearsay is that hearsay
is untested by cross-examination, and that prohibiting hearsay assists the fact-finder in
ascertaining an accurate picture of the truth. See Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern
Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 381–82 (1992);
Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72
B.U. L. REV. 893, 898 (1992).
107 While Mentally Disordered Offenders (“MDO”) and Sexually Violent Predators
(“SVP”) proceedings are technically civil proceedings (because they determine whether a
defendant is to be civilly committed), I am discussing them in the criminal context section
because the proceedings are criminal in nature, since the MDO and SVP defendants are
afforded many of the same procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants (e.g.,
the right to court-appointed counsel and experts, the right to a unanimous jury verdict,
the right to testify in one’s defense, and the right to have the prosecution prove the SVP
or MDO status beyond a reasonable doubt), and the adjudication of MDO or SVP status is
related to the defendant’s criminal convictions. See Moore v. Super. Ct., 237 P.3d 530, 538
(Cal. 2010). While this Comment focuses only on the hearsay implications of Sanchez, not
the Confrontation Clause issues, it is still important to note that because MDO and SVP
proceedings are considered civil proceedings, there is no right to confrontation under the
state and federal Confrontation Clause in MDO and SVP trials, only a right under the
due process clause measured by the standard applicable to civil proceedings is due to an
MDO or SVP defendant. See People v. Nelson, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183, 194 (Ct. App. 2012)
(citing People v. Otto, 26 P.3d 1061, 1069 (Cal. 2001)).
108 The MDO Act, enacted in 1985 (codified in CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960–81 (2017)
and regulated in CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2570–80 (West 2017)) “requires that offenders who
have been convicted of violent crimes related to their mental disorders, and who continue
to pose a danger to society, receive mental health treatment during and after the
termination of their parole until their mental disorder can be kept in remission.” In re
Qawi, 81 P.3d 224, 227 (Cal. 2004) (finding the purpose of the MDO Act is to treat the
MDO, while also protecting the general public from the danger posed by the MDO).
109 The SVP Act (codified in CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–09 (West 2017))
“targets a select group of convicted sex offenders whose mental disorders predispose them
to commit sexually violent acts if released following punishment for their crimes” and
“confines and treats such persons until their dangerous disorders recede and they no
longer pose a societal threat.” Moore, 237 P.3d at 536–37 (finding the SVP Act applies
only to the “most dangerous offenders” who have been convicted of an enumerated
sexually violent offense against two or more victims, and who has a diagnosed mental
disorder that poses a danger to society of reoffending).
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likelihood of reoffending if released.110 Often times, the experts
are not the defendants’ treating doctors, and thus the experts’
testimonies rely entirely on the hearsay statements of treatment
personnel and law enforcement.111 California Appellate Courts
have applied the Sanchez rule to both MDO112 and SVP cases.
In the post-Sanchez California Appellate Court case People v.
Burroughs, the defendant appealed a jury verdict adjudicating
him an SVP, arguing the court violated the Sanchez rule by
allowing the prosecution’s experts to testify to a large amount of
case-specific hearsay.113 The case-specific hearsay facts the
defendant challenged included details about the defendant’s
uncharged sex offenses and details about the defendant’s
behavior while in state custody, which were gleaned from
documents, such as police reports, probation reports, and
hospital records.114
The court, applying Sanchez, determined that much of the
case-specific facts testified to by the experts were hearsay and not
independently admitted at trial, nor did they fall within a hearsay
exception.115 The details of the reports, testified to by the experts,
were the only sources in the record that included the details about
defendant’s uncharged offenses.116 Moreover, the experts’
testimony regarding the defendant’s uncharged offenses was
described in “lurid detail” and was “exceedingly inflammatory.”117
110 See, e.g., Deirdre M. Smith, Dangerous Diagnoses, Risky Assumption, and the
Failed Experiment of “Sexually Violent Predator” Commitment, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 619, 623
(2015) (stating that “trial courts permit prosecution experts to offer diagnoses and
predictions of risk” to support the experts’ opinions on whether to civilly commit
defendants).
111 Id. at 696–97 (“[E]xperts testif[y] as to their diagnostic opinions of [defendant] and
their assessments of . . . volitional impairment solely on the basis of information complied
and furnished to them by government attorneys without ever having examined the
[defendant]. . . . Government experts, in such cases, typically review criminal
investigation reports and alleged victims’ statements (including information that would
be inadmissible in a criminal proceeding) and utilize these accounts of conduct to identify
‘symptoms.’”).
112 See, e.g., People v. Belin, No. E064815, 2017 WL 944210, at *10–11 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 10, 2017). The court applied the Sanchez rule in a MDO case, but found a reversal
was not warranted because the expert was the defendant’s treating psychiatrist, and
consequently much of the expert’s basis testimony was based on the expert’s own personal
knowledge. Id. The small amount of case-specific hearsay facts testified to by the expert
was inconsequential because defendant confirmed such facts during the defendant’s own
testimony. Id.
113 People v. Burroughs, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 660, 677 (Ct. App. 2016).
114 Id. at 677, 680. The trial court allowed extensive testimony on these subjects on
the ground that the content formed the basis of the experts’ opinions, and gave a limiting
instruction that the jury consider the content for that limited purpose only. Id. at 678.
115 Id. at 684.
116 Id. at 682.
117 The expert’s hearsay testimony described in detail numerous sex offenses that
defendant was not charged with or convicted of, including the repeated sodomy of a young
boy and the use of a knife to penetrate a woman. Id. at 684. The expert’s hearsay
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Thus, the court found the “improperly admitted hearsay
permeated the entirety of [the defendant’s] trial and
strengthened crucial aspects of the [prosecution’s] case.”118
Because the admission of the experts’ case-specific hearsay
testimony violated the Sanchez rule, and the court determined
the admission was not harmless error, the court reversed
defendant’s SVP commitment.119
Pre-Sanchez, California courts in MDO and SVP proceedings
have disagreed on the admissibility of expert basis testimony that
is hearsay. Interestingly, regardless of the courts’ determination
on this hearsay issue, the case-specific testimony still found its
way to the jury one way or another. Courts that determined the
testimony was admissible did so based on the “not-for-truth”
rationale, i.e., the testimony is not hearsay because it is not
coming in for the truth, but rather to evaluate the expert’s
credibility.120 On the contrary, courts that determined the
testimony was hearsay nevertheless admitted the testimony, so
long as it was followed by a limiting instruction to the jury.121
Neither of these outcomes are tenable post-Sanchez.122

testimony also provided that defendant was a gang member and described bizarre and
“lethal” behavior that defendant allegedly engaged in while in custody. Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. (holding there was a reasonable probability the jury would not have committed
defendant as a SVP but for the hearsay evidence).
120 See, e.g., People v. Welch, No. H035567, 2012 WL 1107925, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 3, 2012) (allowing the expert in a SVP trial to testify as to the “hearsay” statements
because the court determined the statements were not hearsay, as they were “not offered
for the truth of the matters asserted but instead for the nonhearsay purpose of explaining
the bases for the expert’s opinions”).
121 See, e.g., People v. Dean, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478, 486–90 (Ct. App. 2009) (allowing
expert basis testimony in SVP trial disclosing details of defendant’s hospital and
institutional records because such testimony was coupled with multiple limiting
instructions to the jury to consider the testimony only for the limited purpose of assessing
the expert’s credibility).
122 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. While outside the scope of this
Comment, it is interesting to note that it remains unclear whether the Sanchez rule will
affect MDO and SVP trials (or any trials for that matter) when the proceeding is a bench
trial, rather than a jury trial. The analysis in Sanchez, in criticizing the “not-for-truth”
rationale, focuses heavily on the issue that juries cannot logically follow the conflicting
instructions given to them (i.e., the jury must decide whether the information relied on by
the expert was true and accurate, while, at the same time, not considering the evidence
for its truth). See supra Section I(B). However, California courts have contemplated the
idea that courts (judges) are able to correctly reconcile the conflicting ideas, and consider
the expert’s hearsay testimony solely for the purpose of assessing the expert’s credibility.
For example, in People v. Martin, 127 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 179–80 (Ct. App. 2005), a
MDO bench trial, the court allowed expert testimony reciting hearsay statements from
probation reports that were not independently admissible. The court stated that, because
this proceeding was tried before the court and not a jury, “[w]e must assume . . . the
court . . . considered the testimony . . . solely for the proper purpose of assessing the
experts’ credibility, and not as independent proof of the facts contained therein.” Id. at
180. Based on this logic, one could argue the Sanchez rule does not apply to bench trials.
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Other states that have MDO and SVP proceedings or similar
proceedings, such as Illinois, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Texas, and Washington, have somewhat consistently allowed
experts to testify to the details of the hearsay contents forming
the basis of the expert’s opinion.123 The impact of the Sanchez
ruling is likely to be highly pertinent in MDO and SVP cases
because, in many instances, expert opinion is the only evidence
supporting commitment presented by the prosecution.124 MDO
and SVP trials generally make liberal use of hearsay evidence
embedded in expert testimony, and thus allow extrinsic hearsay
evidence to be introduced to the fact-finder.125 The evidence is also
often highly prejudicial because the prosecution experts, who are
proffering opinions on the ultimate issue (i.e., whether the
individual is dangerous and at risk of reoffending), relate hearsay
details gleaned from, inter alia, institutional records, criminal
reports, and conversations with treatment professionals that are
graphic in nature.126 Allowing experts to relate inflammatory

123 See, e.g., People v. Swanson, 780 N.E.2d 342, 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (stating
expert testimony recounting details from reports in an SVP trial are admissible because
“[a]lthough reports made by others are not substantively admissible, an expert is
nonetheless allowed to reveal the contents of the materials upon which the expert has
reasonably relied to explain the basis of his or her opinion”); Commonwealth v. Miller, No.
702-WDA-2016, 2017 WL 908315, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (allowing the expert to
testify as to hearsay details on the grounds that the hearsay content was not being offered
for its truth, but rather to show what information the expert relied upon in forming her
opinion); In re Manigo, 697 S.E.2d 629, 633–34 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (holding the expert in
a SVP trial could testify as to the details of the expert’s conversation with the defendant’s
non-testifying treatment provider, even though it was hearsay, because the testimony
went to the basis of the expert’s opinion); In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543,
554–56 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (allowing the expert to testify as to the hearsay details of
defendant’s past uncharged offenses from inadmissible reports to explain the basis of the
expert’s opinion because a limiting instruction was given to the jury); In re Detention of
Leck, 334 P.3d 1109, 1119–20 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (allowing the expert to relate
hearsay details from a report because the report contents were used as part of the basis of
the expert’s opinion and a limiting instruction was given to the jury).
124 See Heather E. Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “Far from the Turbulent Space”:
Considering the Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals Accused of
Being Sexually Violent Predators, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 142 (2015); see also
People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 832 (Ct. App. 1999) (“In civil commitment cases,
where the trier of fact is required by statute to determine whether a person is . . . likely to
be dangerous, expert prediction may be the only evidence available.”).
125 See Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora’s Box: Sexual Predators and the Politics of
Sexual Abuse, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2004); John L. Schwab, Due Process
and “The Worst of the Worst”: Mental Competence in Sexually Violent Predator Civil
Commitment Proceedings, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 912, 914 (2012).
126 See, e.g., People v. Burroughs, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 684 (Ct. App. 2016) (where
the expert’s basis testimony disclosed details of defendant’s uncharged offenses, “in lurid
detail” including “the repeated sodomy of a young boy and the use of a knife to penetrate a
woman”); In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 547–48 (where the expert’s basis
testimony disclosed victim statements from uncharged offenses, including those from
defendant’s own teenage daughter, who stated “her father had masturbated in front of
her, and made her sit naked while he fondled her breasts and genitals”); see also Smith,
supra note 110, at 696–700 (stating that victim statements in criminal reports and
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hearsay details concerning, for example, a defendant’s uncharged
sex offenses or lewd behavior while in custody, tempts the
fact-finder to commit the defendant just to punish past
wrongdoings.127 Significantly, MDO and SVP civil commitment
trials implicate liberty interests; the trials are not limited by
double jeopardy and ex post facto protections, meaning liberal
admission of hearsay contents have serious consequences for
defendants.128 To ensure the liberty interests of defendants are
protected, other states should follow a restrictive Sanchez-like
approach to policing the scope of expert basis testimony in MDO
and SVP proceedings.
B. Civil Contexts
The Sanchez hearsay ruling is equally applicable in civil
contexts.129 In Sanchez, the court noted that it intended to
“clarify the proper application of Evidence Code sections 801 and
802, relating to the scope of expert testimony.”130 California
Evidence Code sections 801 and 802 govern the admission of
expert testimony in both criminal and civil cases.131 Nothing in
the Sanchez opinion indicates the court intended to limit its
ruling regarding expert basis testimony to criminal cases only.132
In regards to California civil cases, the Sanchez ruling likely
will not have as extensive of an impact as it expectedly will in
criminal cases. This is because California courts have already

reports of uncharged crimes are often used by experts). Also, experts often do not examine
the defendant themselves because the defendant may refuse to be examined. Id. at 696.
127 See Burroughs, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 684 (stating the evidence testified to by the
expert was “exceedingly inflammatory” because it “depicted [defendant] as someone with
an irrepressible propensity to commit sexual offenses, and invited the jury to punish him
for past offenses”).
128 MDO offenders are committed for one-year periods and thereafter can be released
unless the prosecution petitions for recommitment and, each time, proves beyond a
reasonable doubt the offender should be recommitted for another year. See Lopez v.
Super. Ct., 239 P.3d 1228, 1233 (Cal. 2010). SVP offenders are committed for an indefinite
period of time, with annual examinations to determine whether the SVP status
qualifications continue to be met (subject to continued/recommitment hearings). See CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6604, 6604.1, 6605 (West 2017); see also People v. McKee, 223
P.3d 566, 570–72 (Cal. 2010). “In particular, individuals designated as SVPs are rarely
released ‘and placement within SVP programs typically amounts to a [life] sentence.’”
Schwab, supra note 125, at 914 (quoting Corey R. Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on
Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 448 (2010)).
129 The Sanchez ruling related to the Confrontation Clause will not apply in civil
contexts because it is based on the state and federal right to confrontation, which only
applies to criminal defendants and has not been extended to civil cases. See People v.
Otto, 26 P.3d 1061, 1070 (Cal. 2001).
130 People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 324 (Cal. 2016).
131 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 300 (West 2017) (“[T]his code applies in every action before
the Supreme Court or a court of appeal or superior court . . . .”).
132 See Burroughs, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 678 n.6.
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been following a Sanchez-like rule in many civil contexts133 based
on the holding in Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.134 In Continental Airlines, the expert, an aircraft repair
estimator, was to testify about the costs of repair for an airplane
that had been severely damaged in a landing accident.135 The
expert did not prepare the cost-analysis report he relied upon in
forming his opinion, but rather two of his employees actually
gathered and compiled the specific information into the report.136
The court did not allow the expert to testify as to the specific
contents of the employees’ report.137
The Continental Airlines court recognized the distinction
between allowing “an expert [to] state on direct examination the
matters on which he relied in forming his opinion,” while at the
same time, not allowing an expert to “testify as to the details of
such matters if they [were] otherwise inadmissible.”138 The
court relied on the rationale that an expert “may not under the
guise of reasons bring before the jury incompetent hearsay
evidence.”139 Further, the court stated that an expert “may not
relate an out-of-court opinion by another expert as independent
proof of fact.”140
While the court in Continental Airlines did not touch on
the distinction between general background information and
case-specific facts, the hearsay analysis is effectively the same as
in Sanchez.141 California courts have followed the rule recognized
by Continental Airlines in a number of civil contexts, including

133 While beyond the scope of this Comment, it is interesting that a more restrictive
approach to the scope of expert basis testimony has been applied in California civil cases
than in criminal cases pre-Sanchez. It is curious that criminal defendants have been
receiving less protection than civil parties, especially considering the differing
consequences in criminal versus civil cases, namely liberty interests versus mere
pecuniary interests.
134 Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Ct. App.
1989). Continental Airlines was a civil suit that alleged negligence, strict liability, deceit,
breach of warranty, and breach of contract based on an airplane crash involving an
aircraft that was sold from McDonnell Douglas to Continental Airlines. Id. at 782–83.
135 See id. at 792.
136 See id. The expert stated that he had seen the report, but did not verify the data
and numbers or “review them hard” because “[t]hey looked like they were in the
ballpark.” Id.
137 Id. at 794.
138 Id. at 793 (quoting Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 369 (Ct. App.
1981)).
139 Cont’l Airlines, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
140 Id. at 794 (quoting Mosesian v. Pennwalt Corp., 236 Cal. Rptr. 778, 782 (Ct.
App. 1987)) (“It is proper to solicit the fact that another expert was consulted to show
the foundation of the testifying expert’s opinion, but not to reveal the content of the
hearsay opinion.”).
141 See Brazier & Frank, supra note 24.
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product liability, strict liability, and negligence cases.142
However, the Sanchez rule may have a noticeable impact on two
civil contexts in California: (1) certain medical professional
expert testimony in medical malpractice, and (2) personal injury
cases, and cases involving valuation of property or services.
Generally, California courts have not allowed physician
experts to testify to the hearsay statements of other non-testifying
physicians in medical malpractice and personal injury cases.143
But, California courts have allowed a physician expert to testify as
to the out-of-court opinions of other non-testifying physicians if
certain “limited admissibility”144 requirements are met.145
Application of the limited admissibility doctrine has been held to
be appropriate “in situations where the out-of-court doctors’
opinion is truly ‘on a parity with a patient’s history . . . given to
[the patient’s] physician’ and is ‘a part of the information’ used by
the physician in ‘diagnosis and treatment.’”146
Legal scholars have theorized that application of the limited
admissibility doctrine to physician basis testimony is warranted
because the testifying doctor relied on the opinions of the other
doctors in their medical treatment of the patient, and thus the
law should not prevent the physician from doing the same at
142 See, e.g., Cantu v. Hermansen, No. B257534, 2015 WL 5008279, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 24, 2015) (finding the trial court erred in permitting the expert to testify
concerning the content of medical records when the medical records were not properly
admitted independently); Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 834 (Ct. App.
1992) (holding the expert could not testify regarding the details of hearsay statements
from an informal survey the expert conducted about hotel maintenance practices);
Mosesian v. Pennwalt Corp., 236 Cal. Rptr. 778, 782 (Ct. App. 1987) (“The opinions of the
six outside experts were unquestionably hearsay opinions. Experts may rely upon hearsay
in forming opinions. They may not relate an out-of-court opinion by another expert as
independent proof of fact.”).
143 See, e.g., Whitfield v. Roth, 519 P.2d 588, 603 (Cal. 1974) (finding the expert
doctors could not testify as to the out-of-court statements of other non-testifying doctors to
show the basis of the experts’ opinions because the statements of the non-testifying
doctors were hearsay); Jamison v. Lindsay, 166 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (Ct. App. 2007)
(finding the court properly precluded the expert from testifying to the hearsay statements
of a non-testifying doctor, stating “[o]pinions of out-of-court experts are not admissible to
show the basis of a testifying expert’s opinion if the witness did not use the opinions of the
out-of-court [doctor] in the course of treatment or diagnosis of the plaintiff”); Williams v.
Rizvi, No. F038590, 2003 WL 165017, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2003) (holding that it
was proper to preclude the expert physician from testifying as to the hearsay contents of
the excluded portions of an operative report).
144 When referring to the doctrine of limited admissibility, I am referring to the
doctrine as it was applied to physician basis testimony in Kelley v. Bailey, 11 Cal. Rptr.
448, 454–55 (Ct. App. 1961), not the general application of the doctrine of limited
admissibility as stated in CAL. EVID. CODE § 355 (West 2017).
145 It should be noted that this limited admissibility applies only to expert witnesses
testifying as treating doctors, not to doctors who are consulted solely to render expert
opinions. See Trannguyen v. Laska, No. B172741, 2004 WL 2498279, at *8–9 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 8, 2004).
146 Whitfield, 519 P.2d at 603 n.26 (quoting Kelley, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 455).
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trial.147 However, the logic behind the Sanchez rule would seem
to render evidence that falls within the doctrine of limited
admissibility inadmissible in the post-Sanchez world. This is
because the expert medical professional’s testimony is relating
case-specific hearsay from a different (non-testifying) medical
professional.148 Further, relating the non-testifying doctor’s
opinion, which is identical to the expert’s opinion, naturally
bolsters and fortifies the opinion of the testifying expert.149
When the doctrine of limited admissibility is applied, a
limiting instruction is given instructing the jury to consider the
evidence for the “narrow and limited purpose” of disclosing the
“information upon which the physician based his diagnosis and
treatment [on],” and “not as independent proof of the facts.”150
While the Sanchez court did not address medical expert basis
testimony detailing case-specific statements of a non-testifying
physician, the Sanchez rule likely now dictates exclusion of such
testimony, since admission of case-specific out-of-court statements
coupled with a limiting instruction mirrors the exact paradigm
the Sanchez court rendered untenable.
In regards to expert basis testimony concerning valuation of
property and services, California courts have somewhat
consistently allowed property valuation experts to testify to the
details upon which the expert’s opinion is based, even if such
details are hearsay.151 Often, a valuation expert’s testimony will

See Volek, supra note 44, at 966–67.
The court’s rationale for allowing the evidence in this limited capacity is because
the evidence “stands on a parity with a patient’s history of an accident and ensuing
injuries given to his physician. It is admissible not as independent proof of the facts but as
a part of the information upon which the physician based his diagnosis and treatment, if
any.” Springer v. Reimers, 84 Cal. Rptr. 486, 494 (Ct. App. 1970) (allowing an expert to
testify to the contents of hearsay statements from a non-testifying doctor’s report based
on the limited admissibility doctrine rationale).
149 Cf. Whitfield, 519 P.2d at 604 (stating the testimony of the testifying doctors “as to
the views of the 54 [non-testifying] doctors they respectively consulted was actually
offered to establish the opinion of such latter doctors”); Williams v. Rizvi, No. F038590,
2003 WL 165017, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2003) (“[T]he only purpose in plaintiff’s
expert testifying to the excluded portions of [the non-testifying doctor’s] operative report
would be to bolster the opinion of plaintiff’s expert.”).
150 Kelley, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
151 See, e.g., Appel v. Burman, 206 Cal. Rptr. 259, 263–64 (Ct. App. 1984) (allowing an
architect expert to testify as to the details of a cost estimate report performed by a nontestifying cost estimator); McElligott v. Freeland, 33 P.2d 430, 436–37 (Cal. Ct. App.
1934) (allowing an accounting expert to testify as to the details of the hearsay information
he based his property valuation on); see also Burow v. JTL Dev. Corp., Inc., 2d Civil No.
B227256, 2012 WL 34384, at *3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2012) (allowing the expert to
testify as to the details of data and laboratory tests conducted by a non-testifying engineer
in opining on a measurement of future soil consolidation); Blakenbaker v. Ingram, No.
E033930, 2005 WL 40033, at *2–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2005) (finding an accident
reconstructionist expert’s testimony relating the measurements of crush damage to a car
147
148
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be derived from predominantly inadmissible hearsay sources.152
Therefore, in order to inform the fact-finder of the information
relied upon to assist in weighing the expert’s credibility,
California courts have held that an expert “should, so far as is
practicable, detail the facts upon which his conclusion or
judgment is based even though the facts upon which he relies
would be incompetent to affect value in the particular case.”153
The California courts’ rationale in finding the hearsay facts are
reliable is that the valuation expert evaluates the hearsay and
“gives the sanction of his general experience.”154
In Sanchez, the court pointed out that under the common
law, property valuation experts were one of the exceptions to
the general rule barring disclosure of otherwise inadmissible
case-specific hearsay.155 The justification for this exception was
threefold: (1) the hearsay was of routine use by the expert in
their conduct outside the courtroom; (2) the expert had
experience in evaluating the hearsay sources’ trustworthiness;
and (3) the court did not want to needlessly complicate the
process of proof.156 The legislature’s codification of the California
Evidence Code generalized this common law exception with
courts employing reliability as the key inquiry as to whether
expert basis testimony may be admitted.157
However, under Sanchez, a more cut-and-dry rule has
emerged; reliability is no longer the key determination as to
whether disclosure of the case-specific facts will be permitted.158
Sanchez dictates that “[i]f it is a case-specific fact and the witness
has no personal knowledge of it, if no hearsay exception applies,
and if the expert treats the fact as true, the expert simply may
not testify about it.”159 Sanchez made no indication that it
intended to leave the traditional common law exceptions in place,
taken by a non-testifying individual to opine on the speed of a vehicle admissible to show
the basis of the expert’s opinion).
152 See McElligott, 33 P.2d at 436. In property valuation cases, the basis of the
expert’s opinion may be based on inquires made of others, commercial circulars,
correspondence, newspapers, market quotations or reports, price lists, current prices,
comparable sales, relevant sales known to the expert, and other secondary sources. See 31
CAL. JUR. 3D EVID. § 712 (2017); see also People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 328 (Cal. 2016).
153 Appel, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (quoting McElligott, 33 P.2d at 436).
154 Appel, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (citing McElligott, 33 P.2d at 437).
155 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 328. The court stated the other common law exception was
physicians who relied on patients’ hearsay to form diagnoses. Id. at 329.
156 Id. at 329 (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, at 155).
157 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329.
158 Id.; see also Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 834 (Ct. App. 2016) (“After Sanchez,
reliability is no longer the sole touchstone of admissibility where expert testimony to
hearsay is at issue. Admissibility—at least where ‘case-specific hearsay’ is concerned—is
now more cut-and-dried.”).
159 Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834.
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and thus its holding suggests that the practice of allowing basis
disclosure, in its entirety, is no longer tenable because the
“expert’s testimony regarding the basis for an opinion must be
considered for its truth by the jury.”160
Accordingly, it appears the Sanchez rule encompasses the
disclosure of case-specific facts forming the basis of a valuation
expert’s opinion. The expert’s valuation price of the property or
services is inarguably case-specific, since it is often the ultimate
issue in a case and is the principal matter the expert was called
to give an opinion on.161
Of course, the Sanchez rule does not alter the established rule
that valuation experts may rely on hearsay sources that would
otherwise be inadmissible, provided that it is of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the given field.162 However, Sanchez
arguably dictates that valuation experts can now do no more than
generally state what they relied upon in forming the basis of their
opinions; meaning the experts cannot disclose the case-specific
details of such hearsay information—which could include, for
example, reports or price lists prepared by others, conversations
with others, and newspaper advertisements—unless such
information falls under a hearsay exception or has been properly
admitted independent of the experts’ opinions.163 Therefore,
post-Sanchez, a valuation expert will likely no longer be able to
disclose case-specific hearsay contents forming the basis of their
opinion. This holds true even if the hearsay is of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the given field or because it is a general
practice in the industry to use content prepared by others without
complying with the requirements Sanchez mandates.164
While California has generally followed a Sanchez-like rule
in many civil contexts, other states have liberally allowed experts
Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 330.
See McElligott v. Freeland, 33 P.2d 430, 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) (“[T]he testimony
of the witness wherein he related [hearsay statements from an informal survey he
conducted] . . . was given in response to a question which was preliminary to the matter
upon which he was called to give his opinion.”).
162 See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 334 (“Any expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an
opinion, and may tell the jury in general terms that he did so . . . [by] relat[ing] generally
the kind and source of the ‘matter’ upon which his opinion rests.”); see also Appel v.
Burman, 206 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (Ct. App. 1984) (“It has long been held in this state that
an expert opinion on the valuation of property or services may be based in whole or in
part on hearsay publications.”).
163 See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 334 (“There is a distinction to be made between
allowing an expert to describe the type or source of the matter relied upon as opposed
to presenting, as fact, case-specific hearsay that does not otherwise fall under a
statutory period.”).
164 Cf. Appel, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (finding expert’s disclosure of hearsay information
admissible because the expert “testified that it is the general practice in his industry to
use a cost estimator to perform the actual mathematical computation of an estimate”).
160
161
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in civil cases to testify to case-specific hearsay facts forming the
basis of an experts’ opinion.165 Some states’ evidence codes,
such as Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas, statutorily
allow for disclosure of an experts’ basis, even if such testimony
is otherwise inadmissible hearsay. 166 Other states, whose state
evidence codes are similar to that of Federal Rule of Evidence
703, allow for the disclosure of an experts’ basis, even if such
testimony is otherwise admissible hearsay, subject to a
balancing of the prejudicial effect versus probative value of the
basis testimony. 167
For example, states such as Arkansas, Arizona, Illinois,
Georgia, Ohio, Texas, and Washington, have allowed experts to
testify to case-specific hearsay statements in civil contexts,
including personal injury, negligence, medical malpractice, and
products liability cases.168 Further, states such as Arkansas,
165 For a comparison of states that permit an expert to testify to hearsay matters
forming the basis of the expert’s opinion to states that do not allow the expert to testify to
the hearsay forming the expert’s basis, see 89 A.L.R. 4TH 456, § 3–4 (2011) (originally
published in 1991).
166 See PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 705 (West 2017) (“If an expert states an
opinion the expert must state the facts or data on which the opinion is based.”); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 703 (West 2017) (“If of a type reasonably and customarily relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions upon the subject, the underlying facts
or data shall be admissible without testimony from the primary source.”); TEX. EVID.
CODE ANN. § 705(d) (West 2017) (“If the court allows the [expert] to disclose [the
underlying] facts or data the court must . . . restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly.”).
167 Compare FED. R. EVID. 703 (“[I]f the facts or data would otherwise be
inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their
probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.”), with e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703 (West 2017) (same as Federal
Rule 703), and Ga. Code Ann. § 24-7-703 (West 2017) (“[F]acts or data that are otherwise
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the [expert] . . . unless . . . their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.”).
168 See, e.g., Lawhon v. Ayres Corp., 992 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A]n
expert must be allowed to disclose to the trier of fact the factual basis for his opinion
because the opinion would otherwise be left unsupported, and the trier of fact would be
left with little if any means of evaluating its correctness.”); Nunez v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt.
of Tucson, Inc., No. 2 CA-CV 2010-0201, 2011 WL 1998433, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. May, 18
2011) (allowing the expert to testify to the hearsay statements of a non-testifying
individual’s unsworn written declaration, which was not otherwise admissible); Ziekert v.
Cox, 538 N.E.2d 751, 757 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that “not only may experts consider
medical records commonly relied upon by members of the medical profession in forming
their opinions, but that they may testify as to the contents of those records as well”
because the contents are admitted “not to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein,
but for the limited purpose of the explaining the expert’s testimony”) (quoting Roebuck v.
State, 586 S.E.2d 651, 655 (Ga. 2003)); Thomas v. Metro. Atl. Rapid Transit Auth., 684
S.E.2d 83, 87–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (allowing the expert to testify as to hearsay and
inadmissible attachments based on the rationale that “[a]n expert may base his opinion
on hearsay and may be allowed to testify as to the basis for his findings” because any
hearsay issue “presents a jury question as to the weight [that] should be assigned [to] the
opinion”); Fry v. King, 950 N.E.2d 229, 231–38 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (allowing the expert
to testify as to facts and data prepared by others because the expert verified the facts and
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Arizona, Georgia, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Washington,
have allowed experts to testify to case-specific hearsay
statements in valuation and appraisal contexts.169
Generally, these states have allowed experts to disclose
case-specific hearsay basis testimony based on four different
rationales: (1) the testimony is not hearsay because it is not
coming in for the truth, but rather the limited purpose of showing
the basis forming the expert’s opinion;170 (2) the testimony is
hearsay, but needs to be disclosed to the jury in order for the jury
to assign weight to the expert’s opinion;171 (3) the testimony is
hearsay, but the expert’s experience in evaluating the hearsay
material renders the information reliable, and thus any
inaccuracies go to the weight of the expert’s credibility;172 and (4)
the testimony is hearsay, but a limiting instruction and balancing
test cures any potential hearsay problems.173
The holding in Sanchez rejects each of these admittance
rationales. Experts are used extremely often in civil cases, almost
data by use of Google Earth based on the reasoning that any inaccuracies go to the weight
of the testimony, and not the admissibility); Stam v. Mack, 984 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1999) (allowing a physician expert to testify as to the details of a non-testifying
physician’s opinion because the state evidence rules “allow a testifying expert to relate on
direct examination the reasonably reliable facts and data on which he relied in forming
his opinion” subject to a limiting instruction and balancing test); Allen v. Asbestos Corp.,
157 P.3d 406, 413 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (allowing the expert to testify as to otherwise
inadmissible hearsay facts because “[t]he otherwise inadmissible facts or data underlying
an expert’s opinion [are] admissible for the limited purpose of explaining the basis of an
expert’s opinion, but [are] not substantive evidence”).
169 See, e.g., Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Schell, 683 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1985) (stating that “an expert must be allowed to disclose to the trier of fact the
basis for his opinion, as otherwise the opinion is left unsupported in midair with little if
any means for evaluating its correctness”); Town of Gilbert v. Freeman, No. 1A-CV090660, 2010 WL 5018514, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (allowing the expert to testify to
hearsay details based on the rationale that the disclosure of hearsay facts or data not
admitted in evidence go to the credibility of the expert’s opinion, not the truth of the
matter asserted); King v. Browning, 268 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga. 1980) (allowing a surveyor
expert to testify to hearsay facts because “[a]n expert may base his opinion on hearsay
and may be allowed to testify as to the basis for his findings”); Williamson v. Harvey
Smith, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 151, 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (allowing the expert to testify to the
details of a report prepared by another inspector); Martin v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 953
So.2d 1163, 1167 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Bishop v. Miss. Trans. Comm’n, 734 So.2d
218, 221 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)) (allowing a valuation expert to testify to details of another
non-testifying expert because “a witness is not a mere conduit, if the ‘expertise of the
testifying witness is such as to permit that witness’s adoption of the statements of a
similar expert’”); Barrack v. Kolea, 651 A.2d 149, 155–56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (allowing
the expert to testify as to the details of cost figures prepared by his non-testifying
subcontractors); Deep Water Brewing, LLC v. Fairway Res. Ltd., 215 P.3d 990, 1014
(Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (allowing the appraiser expert to testify as to the details of past
appraisal reports prepared by non-testifying experts).
170 See, e.g., Ziekert, 538 N.E.2d at 757; Town of Gilbert, 2010 WL 5018514, at *5.
171 See, e.g., Lawhon, 992 S.W.2d at 166; Thomas, 684 S.E.2d at 88.
172 See, e.g., Martin, 953 So.2d at 1167; Deep Water Brewing, 215 P.3d at 1014; Fry,
950 N.E.2d at 236.
173 See, e.g., Stam, 984 S.W.2d at 750.
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universally when it comes to quantifying value and damages, and
are often a necessary and critical part of litigation because expert
testimony can help the fact-finder understand complex facts and
issues.174 Because experts offer testimony that is often central to
the question of liability in a case,175 the need for jurors to have all
the information forming the basis of an expert’s opinion becomes
obvious; jurors need to assess the expert’s credibility when
deciding the outcome of a case.
However, Sanchez exposes the issues that arise if experts are
permitted to relate otherwise inadmissible basis testimony to the
fact-finder: When experts treat hearsay statements as true and
accurate in forming the basis of their opinion, jurors must accept
the hearsay statements as true if they believe the expert is
credible, and thus the statements are inescapably being admitted
for their truth.176 The Sanchez court realized that merely telling
the jury that the expert relied on additional information in
general terms, as opposed to reciting the details, might do less to
bolster the credibility and weight of the expert’s opinion.177
However, this point confirms the case-specific hearsay, if
admitted, is in fact being considered for its truth. If admittance
bolsters the expert’s opinion, “[t]he expert is essentially telling
the jury: ‘You should accept my opinion because it is reliable in
light of these facts on which I rely.’”178 Because it cannot logically
be maintained that the case-specific hearsay statements are not
being admitted for their truth, and it is dangerously likely the
fact-finder is considering such hearsay statements for their
truth179, other states should follow the Sanchez rule.180

174 See Greg Eastman, Vandy M. Howell & Maria Salgado, A Primer on When to
Use Expert Witnesses and How to Find Them, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 7, 2013),
https://www.bna.com/a-primer-on-when-to-use-expert-witnesses-and-how-to-find-them/
[http://perma.cc/R45D-UUDX].
175 See id.
176 See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 New York, for example, already follows a Sanchez-like rule based on the reasoning
in the 2005 case People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 729–33 (N.Y. 2005), which
disallowed a physiatrist expert from testifying to the details of interviews with third
parties forming the basis of the expert’s opinion regarding the defendant’s sanity. The
New York court reasoned:
We do not see how the jury could use the statements of the interviewees to
evaluate [the expert’s] opinion without accepting as a premise either that the
statements were true or that they were false. Since the prosecution’s goal was
to buttress [the expert’s] opinion, the prosecution obviously wanted and
expected the jury to take the statements as true.
Id. at 732.
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III. SANCHEZ AND FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703
California’s restrictive Sanchez method in policing the scope
of expert basis testimony differs from the current federal method.
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 currently states:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the
expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in
the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or
data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible
for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise
be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the
jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the
opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.181

Thus, the current federal rule, while taking an approach that
favors exclusion, allows experts to relate case-specific hearsay for
the purpose of assisting the jury in evaluating the expert’s
opinion if the hearsay content’s probative value in assisting the
jury in weighing the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs the
risk of prejudice resulting from the jury’s potential misuse of the
information.182 If the court determines the hearsay contents can
be admitted, Rule 703 requires a limiting instruction, upon
request, instructing the jury not to use the information as
substantive evidence.183
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court grappled with the same
hearsay issue that was presented in Sanchez—the admissibility
of expert basis testimony disclosing inadmissible hearsay—albeit
in a federal Confrontation Clause context in Williams v.
Illinois.184 Williams was a criminal rape prosecution in which the
identity of the offender was a central issue.185 DNA evidence was
collected from the victim and sent to an outside laboratory for
analysis.186 Independent of the rape case, the defendant’s DNA
was in the state’s police database.187 The prosecution called an
expert who testified that she compared the DNA sample from the
outside laboratory to the known DNA sample of the defendant,
concluding the two DNA samples matched.188 The issue
presented to the Court was whether the details of the outside
laboratory’s DNA analysis report, forming the basis of the

181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added).
Id. (advisory committee’s note to the 2000 Amendment).
See id.
See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 56 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 60.
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expert’s opinion, were inadmissible hearsay.189 A four-member
plurality opined the expert’s testimony regarding the contents of
the outside laboratory’s DNA report was non-hearsay, and thus
admissible, since it was admitted to help the fact-finder assess
the expert’s testimony, and not for its truth.190 However, five
justices (a four-member dissent and a one-member concurrence
writing separately) specifically rejected the plurality’s “not-fortruth” rationale.191 Justice Thomas’s concurrence stated that the
expert’s testimony did not merely reveal the opinion basis
because the validity of the expert’s opinion “ultimately turned on
the truth of [the hearsay] statements.”192 Similarly, the dissent
stated, in order “to determinate the validity of the [expert’s]
conclusion, the factfinder must assess the truth of the out-ofcourt statement on which it relies,” which contributed to the
dissent’s consensus that the “not-for-truth” rationale is “very
weak, factually implausible, nonsense, and a sheer fiction.”193 It
is the analysis of these five justices in Williams that directly
influenced the Sanchez court’s ruling.194
Despite the strong opinions of a majority of justices in the
Williams case regarding the flaws of the “not-for-truth” rationale,

189 And, further, the Court was presented with the question of whether the admission
of the expert’s testimony violated the Federal Confrontation Clause. Id. at 57.
190 The plurality further held this type of expert testimony does not violate the
Federal Confrontation Clause because the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation has no
application to out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. Id. A five-justice majority (the four-member plurality and Justice Thomas)
opined that the independent laboratory report was not testimonial and thus mooted the
Rule 703 issue. Id. at 85–86, 97 (Thomas, J., concurring).
191 See generally id. at 103–40 (referring to Justice Thomas’s concurrence and
Justice Kagan’s dissent, with whom Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Sotomayor joined).
192 Id. at 108 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating the “not-for-truth” rational
“overlook[ed] that the value of [the expert’s] testimony depended on the truth of those
very assumptions”).
193 Id. at 125–28 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.10.1
(2d ed. 2011)). The dissent went on to illustrate the flaw in the “not-for-truth” rationale:
The Confrontation Clause prevented the State from introducing that report
into evidence except by calling to the stand the person who prepared it. So the
State tried another route—introducing the substance of the report as part and
parcel of an expert witness’s conclusion. In effect, [the expert] testified . . . “I
concluded that Williams was the rapist because [the outside laboratory], an
accredited and trustworthy laboratory, says that the rapist has a particular
DNA profile and, look, Williams has an identical one. . . .” Nothing in [the
expert’s] testimony indicates that she was making an assumption or
considering a hypothesis. To the contrary, [the expert] affirmed, without
qualification, that the Cellmark report showed a “male DNA profile found in
semen from the vaginal swabs of [the victim].”
Id. at 111–30.
194 See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 330–33 (Cal. 2016) (discussing the opinions of
the five justices in Williams who expressly rejected the “not-for-truth” rationale, stating
“[w]e find persuasive the reasoning of a majority of justices in Williams”).
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some federal courts have allowed experts to relate otherwise
inadmissible hearsay evidence to the fact-finder on the grounds
the evidence is being admitted solely to assist the fact-finder in
evaluating the expert’s opinion.195 On the other hand, some
federal courts have not permitted experts to testify to
case-specific hearsay evidence on the grounds the hearsay
contents are more prejudicial than probative under Rule 703.196
Legal scholars have also diverged on whether experts in federal
courts should be able to testify to case-specific facts from
otherwise inadmissible hearsay sources.197 Thus, there has been
195 See, e.g., U.S. v. NCR Corp., 960 F. Supp. 2d 793, 834–36 (E.D. Wis. 2013)
(allowing the expert to testify regarding the details of a report prepared by others because
it is customary for experts in this field to rely on and adopt such reports in forming their
opinion, even though the expert is unfamiliar with the details of how such a report is
made); In re Moyer, 421 B.R. 587, 596–97 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) (allowing the expert to
testify to the hearsay details of a report, stating that “[w]hile, normally the Report itself
would be inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 as hearsay, the Court finds it
admissible to explain the basis of [the expert’s] opinion, not as substantive evidence”);
Geyer v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1216–18 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (allowing a
physician expert, who did not examine the plaintiff, to testify to hearsay details of medical
records and reports prepared by non-testifying physicians); Westfield Ins. Co. v. Harris,
134 F.3d 608, 611–13 (4th Cir. 1998) (allowing Fire Marshall expert to testify to the
hearsay details of reports made by the insurance company investigator and discussions
with the expert’s subordinates); U.S. v. Wolling, 223 Fed. Appx. 610, 612 (9th Cir. 2007)
(allowing a defense expert to describe the hearsay contents of medical reports that were
excluded from being admitted into evidence under the Rule 703 balancing test); In re
Amey, 40 A.3d 902, 914–15 (D.C. 2012) (allowing psychiatrist to testify to the hearsay
contents forming the basis of the expert’s opinion, including reports and notes prepared
by other doctors because a limiting instruction was given to the jury).
196 See, e.g., McDevitt v. Guenther, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1294 (D. Haw. 2007)
(holding that, while it is permissible for the expert to base his opinion on otherwise
inadmissible hearsay, “the facts on which [the expert] bases his opinion are also the facts
in dispute before the factfinder in this case” and “[f]or this reason, the probative value of
any inadmissible facts would be outweighed by . . . the prejudicial effect of having an
expert recite inadmissible facts as though they are established”); Loeffel Steel Prods., Inc.
v. Delta Brands, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 794, 808 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Rule 703 was . . . not
intended to abolish the hearsay rule and to allow a witness, under the guise of giving
expert testimony, to in effect become the mouthpiece of the witnesses on whose
statements or opinions the expert purports to base his opinion.”); Mike’s Train House, Inc.
v. Lionel, LLC, 472 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that it was error to allow an
expert to testify as to the hearsay details of another non-testifying expert’s conclusions
and the degree to which the expert’s and the non-testifying expert’s conclusions
overlapped); U.S. v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197–99 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that it was error
to allow the expert to recite hearsay statements from otherwise inadmissible interviews).
197 Compare KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, at 179–80 (“To admit basis testimony for the
nonhearsay purpose of jury evaluation of the experts is therefore to ignore the reality that
jury evaluation of the expert requires a direct assessment of the truth of the expert’s
basis. Having invited the jury to make such an assessment, is it either fair or practical
then to ask the jury to turn around and ignore it?”), Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as
Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in Opinion Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 481, 493
(1992) (arguing that a restrictive approach to policing the bases of modern expert
testimony should be implemented to bar “[d]etailed renditions[s] of unauthenticated
hearsay” and to curb Rule 703 abuses), Daniel D. Blinka, Ethical Firewalls, Limited
Admissibility, and Rule 703, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229, 1257–58 (2007) (stating that it
seems unlikely the amended Rule 703 has resulted in fewer rulings permitting disclosure
for the limited purpose of better understanding the expert’s reasoning because, in certain
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much controversy over Rule 703 as it relates to the disclosure of
expert basis testimony.
The Sanchez rule excluding all expert basis testimony that
relates case-specific hearsay takes a far more restrictive approach
than the federal rule in that it completely rejects the “not-fortruth” rationale, disallows the use of a limiting instruction, and
eliminates the use of the balancing test in determining
admissibility. It is unclear whether the ruling in Sanchez will
influence the ongoing federal debate. The 2000 Amendment to
Rule 703 favoring inadmissibility seems to suggest the Federal
courts are at least somewhat concerned with the potential for
jurors to improperly consider expert testimony.198 The Advisory
Committee’s note makes clear the amendment to Rule 703 was
intended to emphasize the “underlying information [forming the
basis of the expert’s opinion] is not admissible simply because the
opinion or inference is admitted.”199 Moreover, it appears the
dominant view expressed in legal literature seems to reject the
“not-for-truth” rationale, just as the Sanchez court did.200 Thus,
perhaps it is just a matter of time before federal courts adopt a
Sanchez-like bright-line approach when it comes the disclosure of
hearsay evidence forming the basis of an expert’s opinion.

situations, the jury’s need for the basis evidence would likely substantially outweigh the
prejudicial effect of the hearsay in light of the court’s limiting instructions), Mark I.
Bernstein, Jury Evaluation of Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules, 7 DREXEL L.
REV. 239, 286 (2015) (“The procedures adopted by the Federal Rules of Evidence on expert
testimony violate a fundamental logical concept . . . when the factual basis is revealed by
the expert . . . was to be ‘cured’ by the logically inconsistent, totally ineffectual, judicial
instruction to restrict use of the factual basis evidence only to ‘evaluate the expert’s
opinion’ and not for the truth of any of the facts relied upon.”), and Volek, supra note 147,
at 996–97 (stating that “[t]he limiting instruction contemplated by Rule 703 is
problematic” because “the jury must somehow use the inadmissible basis evidence to
evaluate the expert’s opinion, without considering whether or not the inadmissible basis
evidence is true”), with Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion
Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 584 (1987) (arguing
that “the introduction of the inadmissible facts or data upon which experts rely no more
violates the hearsay rule’s spirit than do the volumes of evidence that regularly are
introduced through the numerous hearsay rule exceptions”), and Alexander J. Toney, The
Credibility-Based Evaluative Purpose: Why Rule 703 Disclosures Don’t Offend the
Confrontation Clause, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 953, 1000 (2015) (“Rule 703 is no sinister
device for admitting evidence when no other provision allows it . . . . [T]he Rule’s purpose,
to offer jurors indicia for assessing the credibility—and, by proxy, the correctness—of
expert testimony, is a real purpose, and one that serves the interests of justice.”).
198 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note to the 2000 Amendment (“The
amendment provides a presumption against disclosure to the jury of information used as
the basis of an expert’s opinion and is not admissible for any substantive purpose, when
that information is offered by the proponent of the expert.”).
199 Id.
200 See Toney, supra note 197, at 984–85 (citing to treatises, law review articles, and
Professor Richard Friedman’s amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in
Williams v. Illinois to support the inference that the view that juries must consider basis
evidence for its truth is the dominant view in the federal realm).
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CONCLUSION
Prior to People v. Sanchez, California courts have long
tolerated experts disclosing to the jury case-specific out-of-court
statements forming the basis of the expert’s opinion under the
guise that the statements were being offered for the sole purpose
of explaining the expert’s opinion basis, and that, in most
instances, a limiting instruction could cure any hearsay
problems.201 Sanchez struck down this paradigm, holding the
expert’s testimony regarding the basis for the opinion must be
considered for its truth by the jury and the jury’s evaluation of an
expert’s opinion requires a direct assessment of the truth of the
basis forming the expert’s opinion.202 Post-Sanchez, an expert
may no longer relate to the jury case-specific out-of-court
statements when, to support the expert’s opinion, the expert
treats the content of the statements as true and accurate.203 Such
statements are hearsay and to be admissible, must fall within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception or be properly admitted
independent of the expert’s testimony.204
What does this mean for California trial practice? Trial
counsel now must devote greater attention to establishing a
proper evidentiary basis for any case-specific out-of-court
statements they intend their expert to assume, disclose, and
opine on. California courts will have to act as stricter gatekeepers
in policing the disclosure of expert basis testimony, and will
likely face much stricter appellate review in such matters.205 If
trial counsel cannot independently admit the case-specific facts,
or the case-specific facts do not fall under an applicable hearsay
exception, an expert will likely only be able to communicate in
general, admittedly vague, terms the basis for their opinion, and
hope the jury will trust and believe the expert.206 In upcoming
cases, it is likely there will be much litigation over what
constitutes a case-specific fact.207 Moreover, courts will likely also

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 333 (Cal. 2016).
Id. at 334.
Id. at 333 (“Like any other hearsay evidence [the out-of-court statements] must be
admitted through an applicable hearsay exception. Alternatively, the evidence can be
admitted through an appropriate witness and the expert may assume its truth in a
properly worded hypothetical question.”).
205 Of course, any Sanchez challenge must survive a harmless error analysis.
206 See, e.g., People v. Atkins, No. B278735, 2017 WL 3587418, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 21, 2017) (finding no Sanchez violation because the expert merely recited in general
terms the basis for his opinion was conversations with other gang detectives, and offered
no specific details concerning those communications).
207 For example, in order to obtain a gang enhancement conviction, one element the
prosecution must prove is that members of the gang have engaged in a pattern of criminal
gang activity by committing two or more “predicate offenses” (which are statutorily
201
202
203
204
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grapple with determining what basis testimony qualifies as
revealing the general “kind and source of the matter” upon which
the expert relied,208 without disclosing too much information so
as to violate the Sanchez rule.
The Sanchez hearsay rule implications extend and apply
equally in both criminal and civil contexts in California.209 While
some states, such as New York, already follow a restrictive
Sanchez-like approach when it comes to the scope of expert basis
testimony, many other states have rather consistently allowed
liberal disclosure of expert basis testimony, opening the
flood-gates to experts smuggling otherwise inadmissible hearsay
evidence to the jury.210 In regards to federal courts, while Rule
703 presumes inadmissibility but allows admissibility in certain
circumstances, there has been great tension concerning how
much, if any, substantive hearsay detail an expert may relate to
the fact-finder as opinion basis testimony.211 Perhaps California’s
return to the restrictive approach to policing the scope of expert
basis testimony will encourage other states, as well as federal
courts, to become stricter gatekeepers, thereby curbing the
practice of using experts to smuggle otherwise inadmissible
hearsay contents before the ears of the fact-finder.

enumerated offenses). See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 342–43. It is unclear from the ruling in
Sanchez whether predicate offenses constitute general background information about the
gang in question or case-specific facts. Can the prosecution elicit details of these predicate
offenses when such information is not based on the expert’s personal knowledge and not
admitted independent of the expert? If the predicate offense testimony is considered to be
general background information about the gang, if the predicate offense happens to
involve the specific defendant in the case, does this fact shift the testimony from general
background information to case-specific facts? Compare e.g., People v. Vasquez, No.
C069228, 2017 WL 3699636, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2017) (holding testimony
detailing predicate offenses were “more akin to general background information
concerning the gang” as the predicate convictions did not involve the defendant), and
People v. Chavez, No. C074316, 2016 WL 5940068, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2016)
(finding testimony regarding predicate offenses did not involve the defendant or events
involved in the case, and thus were not case-specific, but rather general background
information concerning the gang), with People v. Lara, 215 Cal. Rptr. 3d 91, 126–27 (Ct.
App. 2017) (determining the gang expert’s testimony regarding the predicate offenses,
which involved the defendant, were case-specific facts), and People v. Carrillo, No.
F070459, 2017 WL 2463468, at *23 (Cal. Ct. App. June 7, 2017) (holding testimony
detailing predicate offenses involving defendant were case-specific facts, not general
background information).
208 Id. at 685–86 (“Any expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion, and
may tell the jury in general terms that he did so . . . [by] relat[ing] generally the kind and
source of the ‘matter’ upon which his opinion rests.”).
209 See supra Sections II(A) and II(B).
210 See supra Sections II(A) and II(B).
211 See supra Part III.
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